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Chapter XX: 
New Public Management: Restoring the Public Trust Through Creating distrust? 
Steven Van de Walle 
 
Introduction 
Policy makers frequently invoked restoring the public sector’s legitimacy as one of the 
main motivations for public sector reform in the 1980s and ‘90s. Low or declining public 
trust in government and a decline of the public sector’s legitimacy (perceived or real) 
became a central motivation for public sector reform efforts, notably NPM-style reforms. 
Low public trust worried governments. Not just because of a rise of populist political 
parties in many Western countries, but also because it was seen to hinder effective 
recruitment into the public sector, and because low trust required greater government 
efforts to ensure citizens’ compliance (OECD 2000: 25).  
Declining citizens’ trust in government has been identified as one of the main 
forces driving changes in government (McNabb 2009). The public sector in the 1980s 
was seen to be inefficient, non-transparent, and expensive, and was believed not to 
deliver the services citizens wanted. Dissatisfaction with services was a direct 
consequence of a low or absent customer service orientation, including unfriendly public 
officials, incomprehensible forms and long waiting lines. 
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In this chapter we first show how trust and legitimacy entered the reform agenda 
and became important motivations for public sector reform programmes in the 1990s. 
Creating congruence between what public services citizens really wanted and the services 
the public sector provided was seen as the key to regaining the public trust. In this first 
part, we also examine whether the basic assumption of declining trust was correct and 
whether NPM reforms have eventually contributed to restoring trust.  
In a second part, we elaborate on the apparent irony that NPM wanted to re-
establish the public trust by introducing distrust-based control and compliance 
mechanisms. We show that this is not necessarily a contradiction by distinguishing 
between three different types of trust and by outlining NPM’s effect on these three types 
of trust. We end by discussing the re-emergence of trust-based steering concepts in public 
management. 
 
Restoring the public trust by reforming government 
Public trust features prominently in many public documents about public sector reform. 
One often-used example within the National Performance Review in the US, later the 
National Partnership for Reinventing Government, made a direct link between the 
functioning of public services and citizens’ trust. ‘How can people trust government to do 
big things if we can’t do little things like answer the phone promptly and politely?”, 
(Clinton and Gore 1997: ix). The Government Performance and Results Act explicitly 
linked government inefficiency to low trust: ‘waste and inefficiency in Federal programs 
undermine the confidence of the American people in the Government [...]’ (GPRA, 
1993), and many other government reform documents and public speeches from the last 
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decade of the 20th century show explicit references to trust in government. OECD 
documents in a similar way posited a relation between public sector performance and 
public trust, driven by the conviction that trust in government had declined and that 
therefore a reform was needed (OECD 2000). Reform programmes were very optimistic 
about their own impact on the public trust. The National Partnership for Reinventing 
Government (NPR) in the US boldly stated in 2001:  
After a 30-year decline, public trust in the federal government is finally increasing. 
When last measured by the University of Michigan in 1998, the public's trust in 
government had nearly doubled within a four-year period to 40 percent. While this 
cannot be totally attributed to the results of reinvention, NPR believes reinvention 
has made an important contribution in raising the public's trust in the government 
and creating a better workplace for federal employees (National Partnership for 
Reinventing Government 2001).  
 
Many Western governments produced or commissioned reports exploring levels of 
public confidence in the public sector. Quite a few of these looked into how the 
performance of public services influenced citizens’ trust, often with mixed results. 
Examples include a State Services Commission report in New Zealand looking at the 
relationship between citizens’ trust and government performance in a number of key 
policy areas (Barnes and Gill 2000), a report written for the Auditor General of Western 
Australia (Ryan 2000), work by the Audit Commission in the UK looking at trust in 
public services as part of its work on corporate governance (Audit Commission and Mori 
Social Research institute 2003a, 2003b), or the Citizens First reports in Canada.  
The same period also saw the emergence of systematic measurement of public 
attitudes towards the public sector (Bouckaert and Van de Walle 2003). Trust and 
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confidence surveys, barometers, and monitors of all types became increasingly common. 
Central governments organised broad surveys of public attitudes, while public 
organisations such as tax offices or police forces commissioned opinion surveys to 
complement the already available user satisfaction data. Researchers likewise contributed 
to an expansion of the evidence base on public trust by organising their own surveys 
(Vigoda-Gadot and Yuval 2004; Christensen and Laegreid 2005). 
 
Surprisingly, few of these initiatives explicitly linked up with research done by 
political scientists looking into voting behaviour or political cynicism, despite the 
considerably longer research tradition in this field. While political scientists and 
sociologists in the 1990s had identified several explanations for levels of public trust, 
including many political and ideological ones, failing public sector performance became 
a dominant explanation in governments’ rhetoric, despite the absence of solid evidence. 
Dissatisfaction with the political organisation of government was suspiciously absent 
from many analyses, and it appears political discontent had to be deflected and redirected 
to discontent with the functioning of public services (Van de Walle et al. 2005b) 
Deflecting the political discontent to the functioning of pubic bureaucracies also allowed 
politicians to strengthen their grip on the bureaucracy and to create support for public 
sector reform programmes. This despite the fact that politicians and political parties 
ranked considerably below public officials and bureaucrats on the lists of most trusted 
public institutions. 
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What kind of trust and legitimacy problem? 
Government’s image has long been a worry for policy makers and political leaders. In the 
public discourse in the 1990s policy-makers frequently referred to findings from opinion 
polls to express their concern about the public sector’s image, especially when these polls 
showed a long-term decline in trust. During the NPR in the US, it had become quite 
common to refer to the longitudinal National Election Studies surveys that indeed showed 
levels of trust in government in the early 1990s that were considerably lower than those 
in the late 1950s. Yet, at the same time, arguments about a steady decline of trust are not 
supported by the data. Still, trust in government was exceptionally low in the early 1990s, 
giving policy-makers a good reason to worry. The stream of academic books on trust in 
government shortly thereafter also reflects this concern, and not just in the US (Norris 
1999; Nye et al. 1997; Kaase and Newton 1995). 
In European countries, overall levels of trust can be measured using the European 
Commission’s Eurobarometer which provides a time series starting in 1973. Satisfaction 
with the way democracy works is in this context generally used as an indicator for broad 
disaffection from the political system. Despite recurrent rhetoric about declining trust, 
Eurobarometer data show many fluctuations, but few downright declines in public trust 
(Van de Walle et al. 2008). In many other countries, including NPM champions such as 
New Zealand or Australia, solid longitudinal opinion data were simply unavailable in the 
1990s when much of the discourse on declining trust was at its height. More specific data 
on changes in public confidence in the civil service in a series of countries, taken from 
the World Values Surveys, neither show a coherent universal decline in confidence (Van 
de Walle et al. 2008).  
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Neither the absence of proper longitudinal opinion data, nor the absence of clear 
downward trends where such data do exist should discredit the overall argument that the 
public sector was suffering from a legitimacy crisis though. Despite considerable 
differences in absolute levels of trust across countries, most Western countries considered 
public trust to be problematic. Politicians and civil servants generally dangled near the 
bottom of lists of most trusted professional groups, many countries suffered from 
declining voter turnout and an increase in protest votes, and several countries suffered 
from public scandals laying bare the defective functioning of the public sector. A political 
discourse about declining trust appealed to many, and served as a mobilising force to put 
public sector reform firmly on the agenda (Van de Walle et al. 2005b). 
 
Building legitimacy by delivering what citizens really want? 
The perceived decline in trust was attributed to governments’ inability to provide citizens 
with the public services they really wanted and needed. Not only, it was argued, was 
government delivering the wrong services, it also delivered them in an inefficient and 
inaccessible way. Government was seen as out of touch with people’s need. It would 
have to build trust through providing more choice, democracy and transparency (OECD 
2000: 12). 
These strategies to improve trust are actually based on the very straightforward 
assumption that creating congruence between what citizens want and what government 
delivers is the surest way to creating more trust. Such responsiveness effectively 
transforms the public sector into a reactive public sector, and citizens into consumers. 
The state becomes a supermarket state (Olsen 1988). One other element of public sector 
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reform that still featured prominently in e.g. Osborne and Gaebler’s Reinventing 
Government quietly disappeared from the public sector reform agenda: Community. 
Apart from improvements in service delivery Osborne and Gaebler also promoted a more 
democratic public sector, through more participation and a community-owned public 
sector (1992: 49-75). Efforts to restore legitimacy, however, almost exclusively focused 
on transforming government into a business-like government. New communitarian ideas 
found relatively little expression in public sector reforms, and were largely restricted to 
(intended) reforms in the political sphere.  
Public sector reform efforts to restore trust focused on reducing the distance 
between government and citizens by creating a new public services mission based on 
high quality services reflecting the user’s concern (Ferlie et al. 1996: 15). One way for 
doing so was to restore congruence between citizen needs and wants and the supply of 
public services. The second was to improve the quality of how services were being 
delivered, and thus the service orientation of the public sector. These two approaches are 
largely built on an assumption of considerable homogeneity in the public’s demands, and 
assume that citizens have a clear and consistent idea of what they really want. 
 
Congruence between supply and demand 
By delivering those services citizens really wanted and needed, governments hoped to 
close the gap with citizens. By putting citizens first and giving them choice, citizens 
would be able to receive the services they wanted, and not those service providers 
thought they wanted (Kettl 2000: 2). This could be done through introducing competition 
and other market mechanisms, where the idea was that public organisations would cease 
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delivering those services citizens didn’t want anyway. Because of the disappearance of 
monopolies, (public) service providers would furthermore have to invest in their 
customer relations.  
Creating congruence between supply and demand of services, or delivering what 
users want, meant an abandonment of standardised services and of rationing services 
(Clarke et al. 2007). Citizens as customers would be able to choose those services they 
wanted, from a multitude of suppliers. Doing so required the creation of a public services 
market, and the provision of market information to inform citizens' choices. Vouchers 
and service fees gained importance alongside, or even instead of, public services paid 
through general taxation. The latest addition is the trend towards the differentiation of 
consumers (Simmons 2009; Laing et al. 2009) and the personalisation of public services 
(Needham 2009a, 2009b), supposedly intended to create a perfect match between supply 
and demand through offering customers a tailored service. 
 
A service orientation 
The second objective of public sector reforms was to improve the service orientation of 
public services through customer-oriented reforms. Not only at the basic level of reducing 
waiting times, improving communications, or pimping waiting rooms, but also at a more 
generic level by introducing new opportunities for citizens to express voice and exercise 
choice. Many now common features of a service orientation in the public sector only 
emerged in the 1990s. Examples include the introduction of user charters such as the 
Citizen’s Charter in the UK and similar charters in many other European countries; a 
proliferation of complaints handling procedures and of ombudsmen offices; and a 
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strengthening of citizens’ opportunities to use administrative law to challenge 
administrative decisions. Gradually, the idea of the anonymous civil servant was also 
abandoned through introducing name tags and through making direct telephone numbers 
of case workers available to citizens, in order to reduce the distance between citizens and 
government. The introduction or strengthening of Freedom of Information laws and the 
growth of government websites would contribute to making government more 
transparent. The influence of NPM ideas led to public sector organisations copying 
service orientation ideas from the private sector.  
 
Performance and trust 
The emergence of NPM-thinking did not just lead to a series of specific innovations. It 
also led to a shift in the (perceived) drivers of public sector legitimacy. Whereas 
Weberian bureaucracies derived their legitimacy from due process and the pursuit of the 
public interest, NPM-style public sectors derive their legitimacy from delivering the 
services customers want in an cost-effective, efficient, and customer-friendly way.  
Much of the 1990s reform talk made an explicit connection between the public 
sector’s performance and its legitimacy. Low public trust was seen as due to low 
efficiency and the absence of a customer service orientation, and to a mismatch between 
the services government provided and those citizens wanted. Both empirically and 
theoretically, such a direct link between government performance and citizens’ trust in 
government is difficult to sustain (Van de Walle and Bouckaert 2003). Furthermore, 
testing such a link leads to considerable empirical and conceptual problems (Van de 
Walle et al. 2005a; Van de Walle and Bouckaert 2007). Empirical research testing this 
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claim is therefore difficult to find. Where such research exists, evidence of a relationship 
between trust and performance is not particularly convincing (Killerby 2005; Bok 2001). 
Derek Bok’s study (2001) in which he compared the effectiveness of American 
government in the 1960s and the 1990s found little evidence of a direct relationship 
between citizens’ trust in government and government performance. Earlier, he had 
already criticised the idea as would public opinion be the best index of government 
performance (1997: 55-6). Suleiman found that patterns of distrust in Western countries 
did not seem to correspond to patterns of NPM reforms (Suleiman 2003: 65), and that 
‘Data on public distrust do not adequately explain why reforms have been more 
comprehensive in some states than in others’ (2003: 22). 
 
Did NPM reforms create more public trust? 
The result appears to be widespread scepticism about the contribution of NPM style 
reforms and public sector reform in general to public trust. Kettl did a macro-evaluation 
of the global public management revolution, and concluded, after looking at confidence 
and trust statistics from the 1980s and 1990s that, ‘There is no evidence that the extensive 
management and political reform efforts have halted the downward slide of public 
confidence in government’ (2000: 56). Yet he adds that confidence may need a much 
longer time to reflect changes in government. Likewise, in assessing the results of public 
management reform in a set of Western countries, Pollitt and Bouckaert found no 
indication that public sector reform has lead to an increase in public confidence: there 
appears to be no relation between the extent of reforms in countries and cross-sectional 
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differences in confidence, or between the timing of reforms in a country and longitudinal 
changes in levels of trust (2004: 131). 
Critics have even highlighted that particular aspects of public sector reforms may 
actually have contributed to the public’s distrust. Roberts identified the corrosion of 
public trust as a potential hidden cost of public sector reforms, because reforms have lead 
to a concentration of executive authority, and contracting has made control harder 
through decreased transparency. Combined with a possible decline of public service 
ethics, he claims, the public sector may have become more vulnerable to scandals 
(Roberts 1998). Specific innovations related to NPM have lead to considerable popular 
discontent. Higher executive salaries and a new practice of paying off government 
executives when things go wrong politically (Gregory 2003: 244), and an increase of 
unaccountable quangocrats have created considerable distrust. In terms of transparency, 
business-like operations may have reinforced secrecy, and spin and marketing have been 
adopted from the private sector. At the same time, new transparency requirements and 
improved communications have also made public sector deficiencies and government 
failure more visible (OECD 2001). Despite a growth of transparency-supporting 
initiatives, government has become more complicated and fragmented making it much 
less transparent for citizens. 
The reform process itself has also been identified as a potential new source of 
distrust. OECD stated that the large-scale public sector reforms in New Zealand 
coincided with a decline in public trust because the scope and speed of the reforms made 
them unpopular, and because the reforms themselves created new expectations (OECD 
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2000). Protracted public sector reforms may not always be understood by citizens, and 
may lead to reform fatigue.  
 
Restoring public trust using a model based on distrust 
NPM-style reforms wanted to tackle low public trust in the public sector due to failing 
performance and opaqueness. Ironically, it did so by introducing distrust-based 
innovations. Through a complex system of contracts, fragmentation, short-term explicit 
standards of performance, and audit and control mechanisms, it inserted a degree of 
institutionalised distrust into the public sector (Dubnick 2005). It has been suggested that 
NPM-reforms have driven trust out of traditional bureaucratic interactions, and have, as a 
result, done little to restore the legitimacy of the public sector. In this section, we show 
this is only part of the story (Gregory 2003). 
 
Three types of trust 
Before expanding on this argument, it is necessary to first elaborate on different types of 
trust. Lewicki and Bunker (1996) distinguished between three types of trust: calculus-
based trust, knowledge-based trust, and identification-based trust. Calculus-based trust is 
based on a calculus of the rewards of being trusting and trustworthy, and the reputation 
effects of not being trusted. The fear of the effects on trust of certain behaviours thus acts 
as a deterrent. Where there is calculus-based trust, it is assumed that actors will act in a 
trustworthy way because of the benefits this brings, or the costs incurred by not being 
trustworthy. For public officials, such rewards may include receiving a new contract or a 
promotion, and likely costs are a reputation loss or loosing a lucrative job. 
  
13
Knowledge-based trust is based on information, not on deterrence. Predictability is 
a key value in knowledge-based trust relations. Actors can only trust each other when 
they have sufficient information about each other’s behaviour and intentions. Knowledge-
based trust thus implies that trust is not possible where information and knowledge are 
limited. In a public sector context, knowledge-based trust can be fostered through 
inserting more and better information into the system.  
Finally, identification-based trust is based on mutual identification and shared 
values and goals. Unlike calculus- and knowledge-base trust, it is not cognitive, but 
emotional: ‘trust exists because the parties effectively understand and appreciate the 
other’s wants’ (Lewicki and Bunker 1996: 122). 
 
Lewicki and Bunker (1996:124) regard these types of trust as stages, where stable 
identification-based trust is limited to a few relationships and takes time to develop. 
Knowledge-based trust applies to many relationships, and takes some time to develop. 
Just like identification-based trust, calculus-based trust again only applies to some 
relationships, but in contrast, it can be developed quite rapidly yet remains fragile. It can 
only apply to some relationships because it requires constant monitoring, as well as 
consistent and quick action. 
 
NPM as a system based on distrust? 
It has been argued that NPM is a distrust-based system. This is only partly true. NPM is 
indeed built on the initial assumption that interests are antagonistic, and that actors can 
therefore not trust each other. NPM, with its roots in public choice thinking, is based on 
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the idea that public officials cannot be trusted – they are self-interest maximisers, using 
their administration to fulfil this self-interest (Niskanen 1971). Public choice comes with 
a ‘sceptical or cynical view of the “public service ethos”’, and ‘articulated a moral 
economy of “mistrust”’ (Clarke forthcoming). 
Pre-NPM information deficits and information asymmetries prevented elected 
officials from controlling public officials and holding them to account. Citizens as well 
had little information and even less direct links with public officials, making it also for 
them difficult to check this self-interest. It follows that NPM proponents do not believe in 
identification-based trust, because such trust assumes commensurability of interests, 
which is simply thought not to exist. Instead, NPM has focused on creating knowledge- 
and calculus-based trust. By inserting more control and information in the system, NPM 
would make it possible for principals and agents to trust each other again.  
NPM is thus different from other approaches to the public sector, and especially 
the Weberian assumption of public officials working in the public interest (an interest that 
is, furthermore, straightforward to identify), in that it takes distrust as the basic condition 
of collaboration in the public sector. Principals and agents distrust each other. Ministers 
are suspicious of the intentions of officials and vice versa, and citizens feel government is 
not working to their best interest. 
This initial distrust between ministers and officials is a central theme in much of 
the public choice-inspired literature, in public choice-inspired popular culture (see e.g. 
the sublime TV series ‘Yes Minister’), and indeed in many studies on political-
administrative relations ('t Hart and Wille 2006). Politicians’ and top officials’ interests 
are antagonistic, and relations between top officials and lower-ranking bureaucrats are 
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equally problematic. Likewise for citizens, NPM does not expect them to blindly trust 
their politicians or officials to deliver high quality services (Christensen and Lægreid 
2002: 289), but instead urges them to demand better services and to control government 
output (e.g. through relying on publicly available indicators, or through exercising voice 
and choice). This background partly helps to explain the initial popularity of NPM-style 
reforms: Their anti-government foundation appealed to widespread popular cynicism 
about government. 
 
Creating calculus- and knowledge- based trust 
NPM does not believe in public officials working for the public interest. Antagonistic 
interests between citizens and public officials make identification-based trust relations 
impossible. But this does not mean that NPM is an entirely distrust-based complex of 
reforms. NPM-style innovations focused on reducing information deficits and 
asymmetries, and on more elaborate control and compliance mechanisms. Even markets 
cannot work with a certain degree of trust between actors. Otherwise, transaction costs 
become unsustainably high. 
So what we did see following NPM-style reform is a focus on knowledge- and 
calculus-based trust mechanisms, instead of identification-based mechanisms. NPM 
dismantled identification-based trust relationships (which took time to develop), because 
it didn’t believe they can exist, and replaced them by some calculus-based trust 
relationships (control mechanisms, short-term contracts, competition), and many 
knowledge-based trust relationships (performance monitoring, greater transparency 
through disaggregation).  
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Interactions between ministers and top officials or collaboration between public 
agencies are typically interactions where there is a relatively small distance between 
principal and agent. Furthermore, it typically concerns a relatively small number of 
relationships. In such relationships, therefore, NPM reforms focused on building 
calculus-based trust. In interactions between top officials and officials working on 
implementation; interactions between policy makers and schools and hospitals; or 
interactions between citizens and service delivery bodies, we are dealing with a large 
number of relationships, making calculus-based trust relationships difficult. In such 
situations, NPM reforms focused on facilitating knowledge-based trust through making 
detailed performance metrics available (Van de Walle and Roberts 2008). 
 
NPM’s effects on identification-based trust 
Through focusing on calculus- and knowledge-based trust, and not on identification-
based trust - because the latter was according to NPM’s philosophy theoretically 
impossible - NPM may have contributed to the destruction of identification-based trust 
where such trust existed. Through its focus on control and thus initial distrust in public 
sector reform, NPM has often been blamed for effectively destroying existing trust 
relations in the public sector. Modern performance measurement and management 
systems were often seen to be in direct contradiction to traditional trust-based control and 
steering systems (Halligan and Bouckaert 2009: 271) 
One prominent example is the position of professionals in modernised public 
services. Whereas professional groups such as teachers and health care workers initially 
had a considerable degree of discretionary space and extensively relied on self-regulation, 
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distrust-based reforms lead to a (perceived?) decline of autonomy (Ferlie et al. 1996: 11). 
A system of trust in professional standards and expertise was abandoned and replaced by 
explicit standards of performance (Hood 1995: 97). An audit explosion replaced trust 
relationships, and inserted active distrust into the system (Power 1999), creating 
professionals who didn’t feel trusted anymore (Broadbent and Laughlin 2002). When 
many of such audit and control systems were subsequently found to be ill-designed and 
promoting dysfunctional behaviour, they actively started to contribute to distrust (Berg 
2005). 
 
In interviews with public officials in New Zealand about the effects of public 
sector reform, Norman observed that trust was a recurring topic. According to these 
public officials, it was felt that NPM-related fragmentation and distribution almost 
deliberatively lead to low mutual trust (Norman 2003: 203). The introduction of new 
management tools based on distrust lead to decreasing trust between executive leaders 
and politicians (Christensen et al. 2008: 25). Indeed, ‘Trust has been a significant 
casualty of systems designed to counter provider capture by using competition as a 
method of control, and creating distance between principals and agents’ (Norman 2003: 
203). This distance, and the related absence of mutual trust, contributed a to a climate of 
fear where making mistakes and taking risks is not appreciated and even dangerous 
(Norman 2003: 161). The managers interviewed by Norman in New Zealand stated that 
committing to high and ambitious targets requires trust (2003: 203). They also considered 
strict accountability mechanisms as useless if there is no trust between chief executives 
and ministers, and emphasised the importance of informality and trust in relations 
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between ministers and chief executives. This sharply contrast with the control, 
formalisation and contracts on which many NPM innovations are based (Norman 2003: 
147), and with the compliance and control routines which were widely perceived as a 
burden (2003: 199-200). 
The disaggregation of the public sector into autonomous units, or the privatisation 
of parts of the public sector furthermore lead to a decline in cohesion, and possibly of 
common values (Ferlie et al. 1996: 179). This declining common public service ethic may 
also mean a disappearance of ‘a network of high trust contract relationships across the 
public sector (reflected in low transaction costs of negotiations between different public 
agencies)’(Dunleavy and Hood 1994: 12). This disaggregation was followed by an active 
rebranding of organisations, leading to a wide range of unconnected brands, rather than 
one single public sector brand, and (public) officials now identifying with their own 
organisation and less with the public sector as a whole. This made identification-based 
trust harder to achieve. 
Low-trust short-term contractual arm’s length relationships have replaced long-
term collaboration (Dunleavy and Hood 1994). Such contracts leave little place for 
relational trust, even though trust is needed, even in contractual relationships (Lane 
2000). Using short term contracts for executives may create perverse incentives, and 
replace mutual trust by opportunism (Gregory 2003: 244). Indeed, the introduction of 
contractualism, according to Gregory, was based on a ‘belief that people cannot be 
trusted’ (2003: 245). The result of such contractualisation is then that the new 
institutionalised ‘mistrust fosters more distrust’ (2003: 245).  
 
  
19
Concluding on NPM and trust 
While NPM has often been blamed for creating distrust, the previous sections show this 
needs to be put in perspective. NPM appears to have had a negative effect on 
identification-based trust, but other NPM-related innovations may actually have 
contributed to building calculus- and knowledge based trust. The overall evaluation of the 
effects of NPM depends on the perspective one takes. Some NPM critics equal the pre-
NPM period to one where politicians, public officials, and government organisations 
worked harmoniously together guided by a common public sector ethos and mutual trust 
relationships. 
Others, especially public choice scholars and other scholars focusing on 
bureaupolitics, saw widespread distrust in the public sector, both between politicians and 
top officials, and between ministries defending their turf. Analysts also remarked that 
prior to the wave of reforms in the 1990s, there was profound distrust between managers 
and politicians, between managers themselves, between citizens and government etc. 
(Osborne and Plastrik 1998). Furthermore, traditional trust-based relations were 
sometimes too cosy, as is evident from widespread politicisation and corruption which 
helped NPM ideas to gain prominence, and from scandals involving unaccountable 
professionals. The increasing demands that emerged for increased audit and control are 
an expression of the distrust that existed (Power 1999), and should probably not be seen 
as something that was imposed from above, but as something that fell on fertile ground. 
A final observation relates to the fact that prior to NPM reforms, many public 
sectors already suffered from extensive control and compliance systems. Traditional 
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bureaucratic organisations breathed distrust, and required lower ranking officials to ask 
permission for everything and explain everything. 
This shows that the distrust-creating effects of NPM shouldn’t be overemphasised. 
What is different though is that NPM style reforms are based on deliberate fragmentation 
and distribution of functions, and competition, based on an assumption that trust is not 
possible, while traditional bureaucracy was based on the (mythical?) belief that all 
officials worked for the public interest.  
 
A return to identification-based trust? 
In traditional bureaucratic organisations, there existed little or no need for permanent trust 
building, because trust had become a non-issue because of highly formalised rules and 
interactions (Grey and Garsten 2001). In post-bureaucratic configurations, trust again 
became an issue, which was initially solved through implementing control and 
compliance mechanisms. In more recent approaches to public sector reform, we see that 
identification-based trust has re-entered the public agenda. Recent trends in public sector 
reform see public sectors moving away from command and control systems to trust-based 
steering and collaboration. The desire to lower transaction costs and reduce short-term 
opportunistic behaviours is at the core of this evolution. 
This is evident in a number of evolutions. In contracting, we see a move from 
short-term contracting to long-term, trust-based relational contracting or partnerships 
(Greve 2008). Highly specified principal-agent relations are being replaced by 
collaborative networks, and trust plays an important role in these arrangements (Klijn et 
al. forthcoming). Trust is also re-entering relations between ministries and executive 
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agencies (van Thiel and Yesilkagit 2008). The repolitisation of relations between 
politicians and top executives in some countries is further evidence of this trend (Halligan 
2007). The new idea appears to be that ‘trust may best be fostered by trust’ (Gregory 
2003: 245). 
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